

Genocide as Contentious Politics

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Abstract

Despite a recent turn towards the study of political violence within the field of contentious politics, scholars have yet to focus their lens on genocide. This is puzzling, as the field of collective action and social movements was originally developed in reaction to fascism (Nazism in particular), while research on collective action and research on genocide has long shown parallel findings and shared insights. This paper reviews the history of this scholarly convergence and divergence, and suggests that recent findings of research on genocide can be improved by the consideration of concepts from social movements and collective action. It then details three theories of the micro-mechanisms that mobilize individuals for contention—framing, diffusion, and networks—and specifies how they refine existing explanations of civilian participation in genocide. In the conclusion, I suggest that a contentious politics approach to genocide would consider it one form of collective action among others, analyzable within the existing framework of collective action and social movement theory.

The task for social analysts is to demonstrate the ways in which things that look the same may be different and how things that look different may be the same.

– Gary T. Marx, referencing Simmel (2011, p. 7).

Introduction

In recent years, research on violence in collective action and social movements has proliferated. Yet curiously, studies of genocide have not been incorporated into this work (Owens et al. 2013). Besides research that studies how targets of genocidal violence mobilize resistance to their oppressors (e.g., Einwohner 2003, 2006; Einwohner and Maher 2011; Finkel 2015; Maher 2010; Soyer 2014), or how non-targets mobilize to save victimized civilians (Braun 2014; Luft 2013), the question of how previously non-violent individuals mobilize to kill their neighbors is often treated separately and external to research on political violence in contentious politics (Verdeja 2012, p. 307).¹ However, genocide, like other forms of contention, is worthy of our attention as social scientists: basic social processes are at the root of most cases of extreme state violence and how non-state actors choose to respond. Further, the lack of research on genocide compared to other forms of violent mobilization is puzzling when we recall that the field of collective action and social movements began in response to what was arguably the worst genocide of the 20th century: the Holocaust.

To be sure, genocide is often organized by the state against civilians, whereas social movements typically refer to challenges from below.² However, the incorporation of scholarship on political violence into the field of collective action and social movements—whether top-down or bottom-up—is at the heart of McAdam et al. (1996, 2001), Tilly and Tarrow (2006), Tarrow (1989, 2011) and Tilly's (2003, 2005) contentious politics paradigm of research. Further, distinctions between top-down and bottom-up mobilization processes should not preclude scholars from attempting to identify common features that might better situate genocide

within social science as an *explanandum* worthy of analysis, a claim made originally by Fein (1993) and recently reasserted by Owens et al. (2013, p. 70).³ Goodwin (2012, p. 3) adds, “the study of political violence should not become an academic specialty or subdiscipline, but should be folded in to the broader field of contentious politics.”

This paper compares the history of research on collective action and social movements with research on participation in genocide. It then suggests that work on the former can improve scholarship on the latter by helping to identify general mechanisms of mobilization at work. Following the epigraph by Marx, referencing Simmel, above, I propose that even though collective action and social movements tend to “look different” from genocide because of the scales of violence involved in each, processes that lead to civilian participation in both are in fact very similar. Additionally, once a genocide has begun, analysis of these processes can help illuminate the mechanisms by which civilians with no pre-existing history of violence become involved in killing their neighbors. I discuss three such mechanisms: framing, diffusion, and networks, chosen specifically to explain civilian mobilization for genocide. The wide array of research on collective action and social movements prohibits a comprehensive discussion of all the linkages between scholarship on contentious politics with scholarship on genocide. However, scholars are encouraged to consider how mobilization for both non-violent and violent forms of collective action is similar, and to incorporate analysis of genocide into the contentious politics paradigm of research.⁴

The beginning: crazy collective actors and extreme regimes

Social scientists writing about protest in the 1950s and early 1960s were motivated by the puzzle of fascism, and how people mobilized for political violence (Meyer 2004, p. 126). Because the horror of the Holocaust was so fresh, the authors assumed that individuals who participated in collective action were somehow abnormal, irrational, and dangerous. Social scientific theories described movements, and mobilization for them, as the product of grievance and social strain leading to frustration and anomie (see Marx and Wood 1975 for an early review). For example, Kornhauser (1959) argued that large structural changes, such as industrialization and urbanization, led individuals to detach from social groups. The resulting alienation and isolation made them ready recruits for mass movements. Also described as “mass society” theory, this view proposed that “cultural confusion, social heterogeneity, weak cultural integration mechanisms, and a lack of attachments to secondary group structures” led to personality defects and psychopathologies and that these were the types of people who participated in collective action (Morris and Herring 1984, p. 7). Others working in this vein were Arendt (1951), Lipset (1963), and King (1956).

Similarly, the Chicago School of Collective Behavior, dominated by theorists such as Park and Burgess (1921), Blumer (1951), Turner and Killian (1957), and Lang and Lang (1961), proposed that because social order is always changing, there are two realms of society: one guided by institutionalized social order and culture and one lacking structure and organization. Conventional action belonged to the former, while collective behavior stemmed from “undefined and unstructured situations” (Blumer 1957, p. 130). Therefore, collective behavior arose from the breakdown of order and individual anomie: “collective behavior occurs when the established organization ceases to afford direction and supply channels for action” (Turner and Killian 1957, p. 30). Activists were thought to be releasing frustrations, alienation, insecurities, and other tensions (Morris and Herring 1984, p. 13).

Early research on genocide made similar claims: those who participated were likely to be abnormal or deviant, with profound psychopathologies. Extreme social structures inevitably resulted in the use of mass violence for political aims, and these troubled people were ready

foot soldiers. For example, Adorno et al.'s (1950) famous book, *The Authoritarian Personality*, developed the "F Scale," on which "F" stood for Fascist. Nine traits were listed, and individuals who scored high on the scale were classified as having "authoritarian syndrome." They were considered predisposed to accepting right-wing ideologies, ethnocentrism, and authoritarian regime types. Others likewise argued that individual deviance explained participation in genocide (see Waller 2002 for a useful review). Further, in writing about civil violence, Gurr (1970) proposed that participation was the result of perceived relative deprivation leading to frustration and aggression and outbursts of violence. The idea that participation in genocide is the result of pent-up aggressions and frustrations also found currency in works by Staub (1989) and Uvin (1998). Aronson (1987, p. 136), echoing arguments of the Chicago School theorists, described genocide as the product of "social madness."

The middle years: people like you and me

In the mid-1960s, everything changed. Protest thrived in modern, industrialized, democratic nations, and the goals of movement activists were both clearly defined and progressively oriented. Through the Civil Rights Movement, the feminist movement, and anti-war movements both abroad and in the United States, it became clear that individual participants in collective action were far from detached, isolated, or erratic. To the contrary, they were highly integrated into their communities, well organized, and, it seemed, motivated by rational aims (Keniston 1968; Parkin 1968). No longer was collective action seen as the opposite of conventional behavior. Rather, collective action began to be theorized as politics by other means. Scholars suggested that movements were the outcome of rational decisions made by individuals who could not easily achieve their goals otherwise (e.g., Piven and Cloward 1977).

Among these theorists emerged a variety of arguments, the most famous of which is perhaps Olson's (1965): that collective action cannot be presumed to directly flow from common interests (including grievances). If everyone shares the same interests, Olson argued, it will often be both easier and safer to become a "free rider" than to join in contention. The free rider problem could only be solved through the introduction of incentives: private goods (often material, according to Olson⁵) given to people on the basis of having participated. The result was a new framework for thinking about participation in collective action, premised on the idea that individuals will participate when the benefits of participation outweigh the costs (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). This led to acknowledgment of the crucial role played by organizations in helping to generate money and labor resources that would otherwise remain individual (Jenkins 1983; Klandermans 1997; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Oberschall 1973). In turn, it became clear that people participating in social movements were more likely to be embedded in their communities, and this facilitated their involvement.

In tandem, research on genocide began to argue that participation was not caused by extreme and irrational deviance, various psychopathologies, or even pent-up aggression, but rather by the exact *opposite*: scholars asserted that participants in genocide were "ordinary men" (Browning 1998) pulled into participation in violence through institutionalized norms and everyday forms of interaction. For example, Milgram (1974) famously showed that obedience to authority is a compelling motive for participation in violent behavior, even when the individual in question is psychologically "normal" (see also Kelman and Hamilton, 1989). The "banality of evil" (Arendt 1976) conveyed the power of bureaucratic norms to enable otherwise ordinary individuals to engage in horrific acts through mechanistic following of orders. Bauman (1989) also argued that the distancing power of modern bureaucratic structures enabled the average person to participate in extreme violence without feeling personally responsible. Scholars like Browning (1998) similarly stated that the power of a situation frequently overrides individual

preferences to resist violent action during genocide, although this emphasis is on horizontal relationships. According to Browning, in-group relationships compelled people to join in genocide who, had they been alone, might have resisted or refused. The new consensus, in tandem with developments in research on collective action, was that social and situational norms and peer pressure – not irrational outbursts or pent-up hatreds – motivated quotidian citizens to kill.

Recent divergence

The transition from thinking of collective behavior and social movements as the outcome of irrational action to rational, conventional politics resulted in a shift from studying *why* movements happen to *how*. The outcome was the development of the “political process” model (coined first by McAdam 1982 in relation to the civil rights movement) of collective action that combined the earlier emphasis on resource mobilization with research on framing (more on this below) and political opportunity structures (Eisinger 1973; Tarrow 1994). Further, new methodologies such as “contentious event analysis” (Tarrow 1996, p. 874) allowed scholars to specify micro-level mechanisms of contentious mobilization, bringing social scientists together in collaborative and replicative research while engaging in broad comparative and historical analysis (p. 875).

Additionally, the integrative nature of the political process model led scholars to research and identify similarities in mobilization processes across different forms of collective action (e.g., Goldstone 1998). As a result, McAdam et al. (1996, 2001) called for the field of contentious politics as a means to synthesize scholarship and accumulate knowledge on mobilization processes under a shared analytical umbrella. The authors included revolutions, ethnic mobilizations, war, crime, class conflict and class action, repression, imperialism, and more in their definition (1996, p. 20). More recently, Goodwin (2012, p. 3) added that “political violence, like nonviolent resistance, civil wars, riots, and revolutions, is one form among others that contention may take.” In response, there has been an outpouring of scholarship on political violence in recent years that draws on process-oriented theories of collective action and social movements.

For example, two special journal issues in the past decade have been devoted to the study of political violence as a form of contentious collective action (*Mobilization* 2012, vol. 17; *Qualitative Sociology* 2008, vol. 31), and edited volumes such as Bosi et al. (2014) “Dynamics of Politics Violence” likewise emphasize connections between contention and violence. Similarly, scholars in the United States and elsewhere increasingly devote their attention to the study of far-right and left-wing extremist activism (Dobratz and Waldner 2012; Klandermans and Mayer 2006; McVeigh 2009), militant nationalism (Demetriou 2007; Maney 2007), terrorism (Beck 2008; della Porta 2008; Goodwin 2006; Oberschall 2004), guerrilla warfare (Viterna 2006, 2013), counter-insurgency (Blocq 2013), armed activism (Bosi 2012; Bosi and della Porta 2012), violence as an escalation of action repertoires in response to state repression (della Porta 1995; Koopmans 2005), collective killings (Su 2011),⁶ and political violence against civilians (Maney et al. 2012). This is a significant amount of research, indeed. Yet none of it focuses on genocide.

In fact, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as research in social movements and collective action began to cohere around the political process model, research on genocide diverged and came to be dominated by historians but relatively neglected by social scientists (Verdeja 2012, p. 307). Following this, while developments in research on social movements and collective action increasingly crystallized around a coherent analytical framework and called for more work on comparative cases of contention, research on genocide stagnated in the social sciences. This is not to say that historians were doing unimportant work; enormously influential comparative studies came to dominate research on genocide in history at the time (e.g., Kiernan 2007; Levene 2005; Sémelin 2007; Weitz 2003; for non-historians, primarily political scientists, see

Midlarsky, 2005 and Valentino 2004. Mann 2005, a sociologist, also examined genocide in broad, comparative analysis). However, from a social scientific standpoint, these findings were plagued by insufficient attention to variation—a focus almost exclusively on positive cases, which mired researchers' abilities to identify variables specific to genocide (Luft 2015; Straus 2012; Verdeja 2012). Moreover, the macro-level emphasis of much historical research meant that the mechanisms and processes by which individuals decide to mobilize for genocide remained under-explored even as micro-level mobilization processes increasingly became the *explicit* focus of a majority of research on collective behavior and social movements.

Consequently, while research on mobilization for contentious collective action proliferated, historians' reliance on methodological approaches that found little resonance in the social sciences distanced social scientists from the findings of historians (Verdeja 2012, p. 307). In its stead, an interdisciplinary field of "genocide studies" developed, with its own journals, conferences, and professional organizations. The few social scientists who studied genocide found reception there (p. 307).

The future, together

In recent years, violence in Bosnia and Rwanda has compelled social scientists (political scientists especially) to refocus their lenses on the analysis of civilian mobilization for genocide. The turn has also been facilitated by important methodological innovations. For example, research on genocide has shifted from analyses of secondary historical materials to analysis of primary sources including interviews, surveys, first-hand accounts, and historical records (Finkel and Straus 2012, p. 61; Owens et al. 2013, p. 70). Following this, a variety of new explanations for civilian participation in violence have emerged. And yet, the findings of this research remain largely isolated from scholarship on collective action. As a result, the following sections specify how research on three micro-level mechanisms of mobilization—framing, diffusion, and networks—helps explain civilian mobilization for genocide. As noted earlier, the array of research on collective action and social movements prevents a comprehensive overview in this paper. However, future work should consider the mechanisms detailed here and also seek to identify linkages between macro-level structural and meso-level institutional mechanisms that facilitate and constrain contentious politics, including genocide. This may include theorizing from the established literatures on political opportunity structures, resource contexts, and organizational fields, or from emerging work on spontaneity (e.g. Snow and Moss 2014), emotions (e.g. Aminzade and McAdam 2002; Goodwin et al. 2009), and collective identity (e.g. Hunt and Benford 2004; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Snow 2013).

Framing

Most genocides fall along an ethnic, racial, religious, or national cleavage. In fact, the legal definition of genocide requires that they do.⁷ As a result, scholars often infer motivations for civilian participation in genocide from the master cleavage of a conflict, asserting that people join in genocidal violence because of beliefs or feelings associated with their social identity (Kalyvas 2006; Luft 2015). This is what Cornell and Hartmann (1997, p. 52) imply when they write that "[genocides] demonstrate the capacity of ethnicity and race to arouse the emotions, sometimes to the point of homicidal fury." Further, it is often treated as axiomatic that social categories such as race or ethnicity can be easily manipulated for violent ends. But it is one thing for there to be socially significant and politically salient identification categories in a given society, and quite another for these to be interpreted in ways that cause certain social boundaries to increase and other, cross-cutting relationships to tear.

Research on framing, what makes framing efforts succeed, and when and why they fail, can help explain the process by which pre-existing social categories come to matter in mobilizing civilians for genocide. In writing about framing, scholars of social movements emphasize that meanings do not emerge automatically out of pre-existing structural arrangements, unanticipated events, or long-held ideologies (Benford and Snow 2000). Rather, the process of getting people to align with a particular diagnosis, prognosis, and call to action requires active work on the part of movement entrepreneurs (Snow and Benford 1988; Gamson 1975, 1992; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Snow et al. 1986).

Further, recent research suggests that the successfulness of a frame is often predicated on “accumulated history as well as the particular conjunctures of history,” a finding that can explain why some frames are more likely to succeed in producing alignment than others in different places and at different moments in time (Snow and Benford 1988).⁸ Additionally, research on the relationship between “primary frameworks” and “keying” (Goffman 1974, pp. 21–26; 44) is useful for scholars interested in explaining the relationship between deeply held social categories such as race and ethnicity and how civilians align against their neighbors in a violent conflict. Much like Alimi and Johnston’s (2014) study on the Islamization of Palestinian Nationalism, scholars of genocide can trace the temporal sequences by which deep cultural patterns influence how boundaries of contention get defined and redefined throughout a violent conflict.

Diffusion

Another way to understand civilian mobilization for genocide is to consider the role of diffusion. It is one thing for frame alignment to succeed: this can imply that people genuinely believe in the frame being promoted by genocidal extremists, or that they align for other reasons such as conformity or insecurity (see Oliver and Johnston 2000 for discussion of how framing differs from ideology). However, to align with a frame is not the same as *killing* on that basis. Whereas a strong cleavage separating victimized civilians from everyone else is necessary for genocide, the creation of this cleavage alone is not sufficient to explain violent behaviors. From a social movement perspective, diffusion is required to spread action repertoires throughout a population.

Research on diffusion typically defines it as the “strategic spread of tactics, ideas, social and cultural practices, and so forth, across time, borders and cultures, engaging different actors, networks, and mechanisms” (Bosi et al. 2014, p. 15). Likewise, Strang and Meyer (1993, p. 488) define diffusion as “flow of social practices among actors within some larger system.” Applied to collective action, scholars have argued that it is not enough for potential mobilizers to adopt a frame that modifies their perceptions of themselves, their status, or unfolding events; forms of action in response to claims must be diffused as well (Givan et al. 2010). This can happen in a variety of ways (Givan et al. 2010), but a main consensus is that diffusion involves “a transmitter, an adopter, an innovation that is being diffused, and a channel along which the item may be transmitted” (Soule 2007, p. 29). Applied to genocide, we can ask whether some mechanisms of diffusion are more or less common, more or less likely to succeed, and where, how, and why.

For example, research increasingly finds that the diffusion of punishment for non-participation in genocide powerfully influences individual civilians’ decisions to subsequently join in killing (Bhavnani 2006; Fein 1993; Hinton 1998; Kuran 1998; Luft 2015). In such cases, some individuals overcome their resistance to violence through witnessing others similarly situated to them killed for refusing to participate (Luft 2015, pp. 159–160). This is an example of indirect diffusion, which usually requires “minimal identification between adopter and

transmitter, who share similar social positions situated in similar social structures” (Alper 2014, p. 256; see also Oberschall 1989 for discussion of this mechanism as a form of contagion).

Another example of diffusion can be seen with the use of media during genocide. In Rwanda, scholars have argued that the radio station *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLM) played a critical role in motivating Hutu to kill their Tutsi neighbors (i.e., Chrétien et al. 1995; Kellow and Steeves 1998; Schabas 2000; Thompson 2007). Additionally, after Julius Streicher, publisher of the anti-Semitic German weekly *Der Stürmer*, was convicted of crimes against humanity for propaganda during the Holocaust, Article III (c) of the Genocide Convention classified “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” a crime, with incitement referring specifically to the use of public communication such as media to persuade others (USHMM Encyclopedia). There is a substantial body of work on the use of mass media as a mechanism of diffusion for contentious collective action (e.g., Andrews and Biggs 2006; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Myers 2000). Research linking diffusion mechanisms to civilian mobilization for genocide would benefit from consideration of these findings and can help explain core concerns in research on genocide such as the connection between ethnic/racial/religious/national framing by extremists, the use of propaganda in media, and the spread of violent repertoires.

Networks of participation and resistance

Finally, research finds that social networks are critical for explaining who does and does not kill at the micro-level of action. For example, in research on who killed in the Rwandan genocide, McDoom (2011) finds that participants in genocide were more likely than non-participants to live in the same household as or within close proximity of other killers, and Fujii (2009) finds that, in Rwanda, leaders used kinship ties to target male relatives for recruitment into genocide. Luft (2015) examines participation as well as desistance and finds that social ties were important for pulling people *away from violence and for pulling people into it*. In turn, she argues, social closeness on its own is insufficient for explaining shifts from killing to desistance or saving in genocide. What matters is social closeness *as mediated by the immediate context*.

Social movements scholars have long recognized the importance of social networks for drawing potential participants into collective action (della Porta 2008; McAdam 1986; Passy 2003). The trust developed through social networks has been found to help to counteract the risks inherent in mobilization for dangerous forms of activism (della Porta 1988; Loveman 1998; McAdam 1986; Morris 1986), and other work suggests that participants join via their networks because of coercion, threats, denial of needed goods, or a lack of alternatives (Goodwin 2001; Loveman 1998). Underlying these studies and many others (i.e., Kim and Bearman 1997; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Nepstad and Smith 1999; Passy 2003; Snow et al. 1980) is the basic idea that people are more likely to become involved in social or political activities when they are asked or encouraged to participate by someone with whom they have a personal connection (Lim 2008, p. 961). Especially when it comes to mobilization for participation in violence, diverse forms of network ties (such as family, territory, political, organizational, and peer groups) have drawn people into armed violence ranging from participation in the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Bosi 2012) to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador (Viterna 2006, 2013) and left-wing armed groups in the United States and Japan (Zwerman and Steinhoff, 2012). Yet as Bhavnani (2006, p. 659) notes, “despite their prominence for recruiting participants for protest or rebellion in the social movement literature, networks have received limited attention in the context of ethnic violence.” Future research on

genocide would benefit from increased attention to the array of research in social movements on how diverse forms of network ties influence civilian mobilization.

Conclusion

In 2003, Oliver, Cadena, and Roa remarked that the start of the 21st century was marked by protests and forms of activism that have not always been linked to pro-democratic tendencies. Thus the authors explain, “It seems to us that one test of any theory of social movements is that we be able to use the same theory to explain processes in movements we celebrate and those we abhor, or at least to provide a genuinely theoretical account of how they differ” (p. 236). They suggest further, “we may wish to remember the theorists of the 1950s and 1960s, who tried to make sense of totalitarian movement and genocide, and developed the very theories that were rejected by the next generation as stigmatizing and psychologizing movement activists.”

This paper picks up on, and expands, Oliver et al.’s argument. It details the history of social movement studies and genocide studies, including where they converge beyond initial research on participants as dysfunctional and irrational. It demonstrates how even research on participants as ordinary and quotidian was a common theme among social movements and genocide scholars after the social movements of the 1960s.

Next, the paper specifies where research in the two fields diverged, explaining how the turn to scholarship in social movements on processes of mobilization was not matched by scholarship on genocide. The latter emphasized comparative history of positive cases of genocide, and tended to rely on secondary sources rather than the innovative methodologies being pioneered by social movements researchers who were at the time developing the political process model. This was more often than not applied to analysis of pro-democratic movements.

However, a recent turn to micro-level research on genocide, a growing emphasis on disaggregation, and the use of primary sources including interviews, surveys, and first-hand accounts, indicates that perhaps it is time for the two fields to converge once again. In particular, the contentious politics framework, especially key mechanisms from collective action and social movement theory, can offer some of the tools necessary for understanding human behavior in situations of extreme state violence. This paper proposes three such mechanisms: framing, diffusion, and the pull and push of network ties, as a start. However, future work would benefit from consideration of these mechanisms as well as dynamics that operate at the macro-level and the meso-level of mobilization. Social scientific research on genocide has much to gain from increased attention to developments in the field of collective action, and a collective action approach to genocide would consider it one form of contentious politics among others, analyzable within the existing framework of social movement theory.

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Short Biography

Aliza Luft is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her research examines how individuals respond to the crisis of political violence, either by choosing to support and participate in it or by choosing to mobilize resistance. Luft’s work appears in *Sociological Theory* and *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Gender and Sexuality Studies*. Her research is supported by the Fulbright/Chateaubriand and the Wisconsin Alumni Association among others.

Notes

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¹ Su (2011), who develops a community model to explain collective killing in rural China during the cultural revolution, perhaps comes closest to analyzing genocide from a collective action perspective. His analysis of violence in Guangxi and Guangdong draws on concepts of collective action such as identity formation, resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, and framing. However, Su explicitly states that his theory of collective killing shares basic premises with genocide and mass killing but is not the same. As a result, I, too, classify his study as being about violent contentious politics but not about genocide specifically.

² Notably, not all who study collective action and social movements employ this distinction. For example, Turner and Killian (1957, p. 223) and Benford et al. (2000, p. 2717) define social movements as “collective attempts to promote or resist change in a society or group”. Olzak (2004, p. 669) designates genocide and ethnic cleansing as “an extreme form of violent social movements”. Su (2012) provides a useful overview of how “state-sponsored social movements” are distinct.

³ See Hagan and Raymond-Richmond (2008, p. 875) for a brief review of scholarly debate regarding the study of genocide as a sociological phenomenon.

⁴ A similar claim is made in Owens, Su, and Snow (2013, p. 81), who suggest that “the field of genocide studies would benefit from closer integration with the study of repression, political violence, and contentious politics”. King (2010, p. 60) as well notes how “many of the research problems that have intrigued scholars of genocide are well represented in the literature on social movements, collective action, and contentious politics”.

⁵ In recent years, the resource mobilization perspective has been relaxed to include the possibility that non-material incentives can motivate people to join in action. These include moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources (Edwards and McCarthy 2004).

⁶ On Su (2011), see footnote 1, above.

⁷ According to Article II of the United Nations (UN) Genocide Convention, genocide refers to “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group”. Points b, c, d, and e specifically refer to conditions whose cumulative effects are conducive to a group’s destruction. These points are (b) “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”, (c) “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”, (d) “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group”, and (e) “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”.

⁸ For an analysis of when and why framing efforts did not succeed in producing alignment with social categories for political mobilization, despite the efforts of political entrepreneurs, see Laitin’s (1986), “*Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change among the Yoruba*”.

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